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Abstract 
 
In the present paper, the notion that brains in vats with perceptual experiences of the same type 
as ours could perceptually represent other entities than shapes is challenged. Whereas it is often 
held that perceptual experiences with the same phenomenal character as ours could represent 
computational properties, I argue that this is not the case for shapes. My argument is in brief that 
the phenomenal character of a normal visual experience exemplifies shapes – phenomenal shapes 
– which functions as the vehicle for our perceptual representation of shapes. Due to the unique 
mereological structure of shapes, phenomenal shapes are unable to reliably track any property but 
shapes. In so far as reliable tracking is a necessary condition for perceptual representation, 
phenomenal shapes can consequently and contrary to received wisdom only represent shapes. 
 
Keywords: Perception, Shapes, Twin-Earth, Externalism 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A very popular position in philosophy of mind during the last decades has been the view that 
intentional content is external to the perceiving or thinking subject. On such accounts, it is only 
in virtue of reliably tracking features of the surrounding environment that internal states of the 
subject represent these features. Externalism regarding perceptual content is consequently the 
view that the intentional content of perceptual states depends on the tracking relations that the 
perceptual experience bears to the surrounding environment. 
    One of the most important externalists, Tyler Burge, has expressed this doctrine as the claim 
that perceptual intentional relations depend on non-intentional relations. Externalism, or “anti-
individualism” as Burge calls it, is on his view the notion “that a range of non-representational 
2 
 
relations, including causal relations, between environment and individual must constitutively be in 
place, if there are to be perceptual states.” (Burge 2010, 71) 
   Burge argues that the phenomenal features of perceptual experiences are not in themselves 
representational. (Burge 2010, 71; see also Burge 1986) It is because they bear various relations to 
the surrounding environment that they can represent features in this environment. These 
relations are normally conceived of as causal relations. Thus, for example, in the typical case, an 
experience of a certain type is taken to represent a kind or a property because the kind or 
property normally causes experiences of the said type. I shall express this in terms of perceptual 
experiences reliably tracking features in the surrounding environment.  
    Intuitions to the effect that perceptual content is external often rest on various kinds of Twin 
Earth thought experiments (see Putnam 1973). These are characterized by the fact that two 
different perceivers have the same type of experience but are located in different environments 
where they reliably track different properties. “Phenomenal twins” consequently have 
perceptions with the same phenomenal character. Their perceptions, however, have different 
intentional contents.  
    Recent decades have seen attempts to twin-earth colours (see Block 1990, Chalmers 2006), 
shapes (see Hurley 1998, Thompson 2010, Chalmers 2012) and sizes (see Thompson 2010, 
Bennett 2011, Chalmers 2013, Peacocke 2013). In the case of colours, the phenomenal property 
normally associated with a certain colour is taken to reliably track a different colour. So in the 
case of Block’s “Inverted Earth”, the colour spectrum is inverted such that the phenomenal 
property which reliably tracks redness on earth reliably tracks greenness on Inverted Earth. We 
can express this in terms of phenomenal redness reliably tracking redness on earth but greenness 
on Inverted Earth. Phenomenal greenness, on the other hand, reliably tracks greenness on earth 
but redness on Inverted Earth. 
   Attempts to twin-earth sizes normally focus on a world where everything has a different size 
than on earth, yet which is populated by our phenomenal twins. In such cases, phenomenal sizes, 
or the phenomenal property reliably tracking sizes, would reliably track different properties than 
it does on earth. (See Thompson 2010.) 
    Convincing examples where shapes have been twin-earthed are rarer in the literature. Early 
attempts to twin-earth shapes were made by McGinn (1989) (who went on to criticize the 
example) and Martin Davies (1992, 1993). The worlds in these scenarios are also populated by 
our phenomenal twins, but shapes are distributed in another way than on earth. Perceivers on 
this world exemplify the same phenomenal shapes – the phenomenal property associated with 
shapes – in the same way that we do. But phenomenal shapes reliably track different shapes on 
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the twin-earthed worlds than on earth. Thus, for example, the phenomenal shape reliably tracking 
spheres on earth might be associated with ellipsoids on Twin Earth.   
    A convincing critique (at least in my opinion) of these ideas was given by Segal (1991, 448), 
who pointed out that in all such cases, the geometrical properties of the objects perceived would 
be misrepresented. Recently, attempts have been made to circumvent Segal’s objections (see 
Thompson 2010, Chalmers 2012). In my opinion, these attempts are no more successful than 
previous attempts to show that type-identical phenomenal shapes could represent different 
shapes, but I shall not attempt to argue thus in this paper. 
    In the present paper, I shall focus on a quite different attempt to show that shapes could be 
twin-earthed. Chalmers (2012) explicitly and Putnam (1981) implicitly suggest that phenomenal 
shapes could reliably track properties which are not shapes at all, for example computational 
properties. This might, for example, be the case if the perceiving subject were a brain in a vat. In 
the present paper, I shall argue that this is not possible. The phenomenal shapes of brains in vats 
or perceivers with visual systems hooked up to computers cannot reliably track any property but 
shapes. Phenomenal shapes can only reliably track shapes. Or so I shall argue. 
    It is to be noted that if we assume – as seems reasonable – that shapes can only be exemplified 
in spaces, it follows that the argument also shows that our visual perceptions can only represent 
spaces of some kind.  
    The next section introduces the views of Chalmers and Putnam. The subsequent eight sections 
detail an argument in eight steps to the effect that phenomenal shapes cannot reliably track other 
properties than shapes. While this does not show that perceptions do not have their contents in 
virtue of bearing reliable-tracking relations to objects and properties, it undercuts one of the main 
motivations for such a view. For it shows that the phenomenal shapes of our perceptual 
experiences cannot reliably track other entities than shapes. 
   The first three steps suggest that perceptual experiences have a spatial structure and that 
“phenomenal objects” bear parthood relations to each other. Steps four and five introduce the 
notion of phenomenal shape and suggest that phenomenal shapes can also bear parthood 
relations to each other. Steps six and seven argue that if phenomenal shapes reliably track any 
entity, they reliably track shapes. The reason is that the parthood relations obtaining between 
shapes (including phenomenal shapes) can only obtain between shapes. It is a unique kind of 
parthood relation. To the extent that phenomenal shapes reliably track shapes, they reliably track 
their parthood relations as well. The eighth step concludes that this shows that if phenomenal 
shapes reliably track any entity at all, they reliably track shapes. The eleventh section of the paper 
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responds to an objection. The paper is concluded in the twelfth section with a discussion of the 
scope of the argument in the paper. 
 
 
2 Envatted perceivers and phenomenal shapes 
 
Putnam (1981) and Chalmers (2012) argue that we could have phenomenal twins who were 
brains in vats. However, their experiences would reliably track different entities than our 
experiences. Hence, even brains in vats would have perceptions with representational content 
and would be able to have veridical perceptions or think true thoughts. Only in their case, their 
perceptual experiences and thoughts would reliably track other properties and objects than in our 
world. Here is, for example, Putnam (1981, 14) outlining his view: 
 
By what was just said, when the brain in a vat (in the world where every sentient being is 
and always was a brain in a vat) thinks “There is a tree in front of me”, his thought does 
not refer to actual trees. On some theories that we shall discuss it might refer to trees in the 
image, or to the electronic impulses that cause tree experiences, or to the features of the 
program that are responsible for those electronic impulses. […] On these theories the brain 
is right, not wrong, in thinking “There is a tree in front of me.” Given what “tree” refers to in 
vat-English and what “in front of” refers to, assuming one of these theories is correct, then 
the truth-conditions for “There is a tree in front of me” when it occurs in vat-English are 
simply that a tree in the image be “in front of” the “me” in question – in the image – or, 
perhaps, that the kind of electronic impulse that normally produces this experience be 
coming from the automatic machinery, or, perhaps, that the feature of the machinery that 
is supposed to produce “the tree in front of one” experience be operating. And these truth-
conditions are certainly fulfilled.  
 
Putnam does not explicitly discuss shapes in the quote above. Indeed, he does not more than 
mention perceptual experiences. His primary interest is reference and truth in language and 
thought. It is, however, quite clear that his argumentation can easily be extended to cover the 
perception of shapes as well. 
   Chalmers (2012), on the other hand, explicitly endorses the view that perceptual experiences 
could reliably track computational properties instead of spatiotemporal ones. He argues that there 
is a possible scenario in which we are hooked up to a computer simulation. In this case our 
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perceptual experiences are caused by computational properties and relations. (Chalmers 2012, 
335f) Consequently, “our spatiotemporal expressions will pick out the computational properties 
and relations that serve as their causal basis, and those properties and relations really are present 
in the computer.” (Chalmers 2012, 335)1 By implication, a phenomenal shape will reliably track 
whatever computational property that is its causal ground.  
    In this paper, I will challenge the notion that phenomenal shapes could reliably track other 
properties than shapes. Consequently, unless computational properties are shapes, we cannot 
reliably track them. Let us now move on to consider the argument against Putnam and Chalmers. 
 
 
3 Step 1: Perceptual experiences have a spatial structure 
 
Putnam and Chalmers assume that envatted perceivers could be our phenomenal twins. They 
could have perceptual experiences of the same kind as we have. If this is correct, the phenomenal 
character of a perceptual experience must be an internal state of the perceiver. Unlike the 
intentional content of the perceptual experience, the phenomenal character does not depend on 
the relations the subject bears to the surrounding environment. It is important to note that this is 
a consequence of their view. It is not an assumption made in this paper that is independent of 
their account.  
    The phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is consequently not identical to the 
object represented. The object of perception is external to the perceptual experience, whereas the 
phenomenal character is an internal state of the perceiver. On this conception, perceptual 
experiences represent what their phenomenal characters reliably track.  
    One possible way of construing the relationship between phenomenal character and the 
intentional content in an externalist framework has been suggested by Ned Block when 
articulating the Inverted Earth scenario. According to Block, the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experiences functions as a kind of vehicle for the intentional content. The possibility of 
an inverted spectrum shows, according to Block, that we must distinguish between the 
phenomenal character and what it represents: “your experience and my experience could have 
exactly the same representational content, say as of red, but your experience could have the same 
phenomenal character as my experience as of green”. (Block 1996, 27f) On earth, phenomenal 
redness reliably tracks redness. By implication, phenomenal redness is the vehicle for the content 
representing redness. On Inverted Earth, however, phenomenal redness is the vehicle for the 
 
1 For a view very similar to that of Chalmers, see Prosser 2016, 60.  
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content representing greenness. So on Inverted Earth, phenomenal redness is the vehicle for the 
content representing greenness.  
   Now, the first step in my argument claims that the phenomenal character of visual perceptual 
experiences has a spatial structure. This is a claim that pertains to the structure of the phenomenal 
character. Clearly, the phenomenal character of a visual experience must, just like any other 
mental state, have a structure of some kind. This claim is a claim to the effect that the structure is 
a spatial one. 
    This does not mean that the phenomenal character is external to the mind. It is quite 
consistent with the notion that the phenomenal character is an internal state of the mind. It 
simply means that visual experiences have a three-dimensional geometrical structure. We shall call 
this structure a phenomenal space, a term that to my knowledge was first used by Barry Dainton 
(2000). He notes that we are in perception “immediately presented with [...] a closely integrated 
three-dimensional world, albeit a wholly phenomenal world.” (Dainton 2000, 61)2 
    What does it mean to say that our phenomenal character has a spatial structure? In this 
context, it is an assertion to the effect that the phenomenal character has a geometrical structure. 
The phenomenal character has a structure that contains positions or locations which may or may 
not be occupied by various entities. The structure of phenomenal character has a metric such that 
the positions in the structure are related to each other by certain distances; and the structure itself 
has a certain number of dimensions. 
    So we end up with four characteristics of a spatial structure. The first characteristic is that a 
spatial structure contains different locations or positions. I think it is easy to see why at least 
visual phenomenal characters have this characteristic. We can after all distinguish between the 
objects on the left side of the visual field and the objects on the right side of the visual field. If 
you perceive multiple entities, the vehicles for perceiving these entities are located at different 
positions in the phenomenal structure. 
    The second characteristic is that the positions in a spatial structure may or may not be 
occupied. In the case of visual experiences on earth, what occupies these locations are the 
vehicles for perceiving ordinary physical objects. Once again it is, I think, easy to see that the 
structure of our phenomenal character has this characteristic. If you see an object to your left but 
not to your right, it makes sense to say that in some sense of the word there is a phenomenal 
 
2 A similar claim is possibly to be found in Smith (2002). He claims that perceptual consciousness is 
characterised by “phenomenal three-dimensional spatiality” (Smith 2002, 133), which he describes as a 
“matter of the intrinsic character of certain sense-fields” (ibid.). It is however not clear whether or not 
Smith is claiming that perceptual consciousness itself is three-dimensional or whether he is claiming that 
perceptual consciousness is such that it presents us with a three-dimensional spatial world. 
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object that occupies a position at the left side of your visual field but not at the right side of your 
visual field. There is no vehicle that represents anything at your right side.3 
    The third characteristic of a spatial structure is that it has a metrics. Once again it is easy to see 
that the structure of visual experience has this characteristic. Let us imagine that you are 
perceiving an object following a straight path from the left side of your visual field to your right 
side. As it is moving, it is passing through three positions in physical space, A, B and C, such that 
B lies between A and C. If it is doing this, we may assume that the distances AB and BC are 
shorter than the distance AC. If we assume that A, B and C are represented by the positions in 
phenomenal space A’, B’ and C’, it is natural to assume that the distances A’B’ and B’C’ in 
phenomenal space are shorter than the distance A’C’.  
    The fourth characteristic is that geometrical structures have a number of dimensions. There is 
no consensus on how many dimensions phenomenal space could possibly have. But in my 
opinion it must have either three (as Dainton 2000 seems to suggest) or two and a half, as Marr 
(1982) suggests that at least a stage in the computing of visual information has. For present 
purposes, I shall simply assume that the structure is three-dimensional. 
    Structures with these four characteristics will also exemplify certain shapes. So we might add 
that as a fifth characteristic, but it is really one that is entailed by the other four.  
   Structures which have these geometrical characteristics will in this paper be known as spaces. It 
is important to note that I am not claiming that these are the only characteristics spaces can have 
– they can also be bounded or unbounded, have a certain curvature, and so on and so forth. But 
for present purposes, they are the most important characteristics.  
    It is also important to note that there can be many different kinds of spaces. We have already 
encountered phenomenal spaces – the structure characteristic of at least the phenomenal 
character of vision – and physical spaces, which is what phenomenal spaces represent on earth. 
But there is in principle nothing that precludes that there might be other spaces. Tyler Burge, for 
example, suggests that the “geometrical structures in sensory-motor memory correlate with the 
structure of physical space” (Burge 2010, 513). If that is the case, sensory-motor memory might 
also instantiate a space of some kind.  
    Phenomenal space and physical space are obviously different kinds of spaces. Physical space is 
a fundamental part of reality in a sense that phenomenal space is not. The phenomenal character 
of a visual experience presumably supervenes on physical facts, and so its structure – 
 
3
 At this point someone may protest about the notion of a “phenomenal object”, but this notion is no 
more controversial than the idea that the phenomenal character functions as the vehicle for the intentional 
content. When we perceive mind-independent objects, the vehicles of this content are what I opt to call 
“phenomenal objects”. 
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phenomenal space – will also supervene on physical facts. Physical space, however, is best 
conceived of as an essential feature of the physical world and not as anything that supervenes on 
yet further physical facts. 
     Another crucial difference between phenomenal space and physical space is that phenomenal 
space cannot be occupied by physical objects,4 whereas the locations in physical space can be 
occupied by physical objects. The spaces are, however, similar with respect to at least some other 
characteristics –in particular, they are similar in the sense that they both exemplify the same kinds 
of shapes. There is nothing ontologically different about a sphere in phenomenal space and a 
sphere in physical space. The difference is that the sphericality is the sphericality of a phenomenal 
object in phenomenal space but of a physical object in physical space. But that is not an intrinsic 
difference between the shape-properties but of what they are the properties of. They can still be 
instances of the same universals. 
    Shapes are properties, and they can be the properties of many different kinds of objects – not 
merely physical objects but also collections of physical objects and phenomenal entities. But there 
is nothing that precludes these different kinds of entities from instantiating the same shapes. A 
shape is a geometrical property, and as such it can be instantiated in many different kinds of 
spaces. 
    Phenomenal shapes are on earth the vehicles for representing physical shapes. My claim, as it is 
developed in this paper, is that they can only represent shapes but not that they can only 
represent physical shapes. 
 
 
4 Step 2: Phenomenally spatial objects can bear parthood relations to each other 
 
The second step claims that phenomenal objects can bear parthood relations to each other. By a 
“part” I mean a proper part. Consequently, if an object is a part of another object, then it is not 
identical to it. Thus, for example, if you visually perceive a wall composed of bricks, you will 
perceive the wall and the bricks. In this case, the phenomenal counterpart of the wall – i.e. that 
part of the phenomenal character which functions as the vehicle for the representation of the 
wall – will be composed of the phenomenal counterparts to the perceived bricks.  
    Let us unpack this claim in some detail. First of all, we assume as before that features of 
phenomenal character function as vehicles for the intentional content, regardless of whether we 
 
4 We are assuming now that the phenomenal character of a visual experience cannot be reductively 
identified with ordinary physical objects. 
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accept that intentional content requires a tracking relation or not. If this is granted, it seems 
reasonable to assume that if we perceive three different objects, then there are at least three 
different parts of the phenomenal character which function as vehicles for these perceptual 
representations. Let us say that these are “phenomenal objects”. 
    Now, if we in our world perceive bricks as being parts of a wall, then the phenomenal objects 
which function as phenomenal counterparts to the bricks in the phenomenal character are parts 
of the phenomenal object which functions as the phenomenal counterpart of the wall. In other 
words: the parts of the phenomenal character which function as the vehicles for the 
representation of the bricks jointly form a whole which functions as the vehicle for the 
representation of the wall. 
    In the example above, I have argued from an ordinary kind of visual perception to the nature 
of the phenomenal character. A normal case of visual perception of bricks shows that we are not 
merely able to perceive objects as being parts of other objects. Phenomenal objects can also be 
parts of other phenomenal objects.  
 
 
5 Step 3: If a phenomenal object is a part of another phenomenal object, then it is a 
spatial part of it 
 
The third step in the argument claims that if a phenomenal object is a part of another 
phenomenal object, then it is a spatial part of it. 
    If an object is a part of another object, then the first object is located within the spatial region 
occupied by the second object. But the converse need not be true. The same is true of 
phenomenal objects. If a phenomenal object is a part of another phenomenal object, then the 
first object is located at the same place in phenomenal space as the second object. Thus, when we 
perceive the bricks in the wall, the phenomenal objects that function as the vehicles for the 
representation of the bricks are located at the same position in phenomenal space as the 
phenomenal object that functions as the vehicle for the representation of the wall. Since the part 
of the whole is located within the spatial region of the whole object, there is obviously no 
phenomenal distance between them. 
    If object a is a spatial part of object b, then the size of b is bigger than the size of a. This is 
obviously true of phenomenal objects that jointly compose objects. The phenomenal objects that 
function as the vehicles for the representation of the bricks have exactly the same size as the 
phenomenal object that is the vehicle for the representation of the wall. So each phenomenal 
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object that is a proper part of the whole phenomenal object representing the wall is smaller than 
the whole phenomenal object. 
    We have seen that phenomenal objects that are part of other phenomenal objects are located 
within the regions of phenomenal space occupied by the object of which they are a part. It is thus 
fair to conclude that phenomenal objects that are parts of other phenomenal objects are spatial 
parts of them. 
   Let us now move on to consider phenomenal shapes. 
 
 
6 Step 4: Perceptual experiences exemplify phenomenal shapes 
 
If phenomenal objects have a location and a size in a three-dimensional geometrical structure, 
then they will also have a shape. Phenomenal objects can no more than ordinary material objects 
have locations and sizes without having shapes. The shape of the object is what delimits the 
object from the positions in space that it does not occupy. 
    The perception of shapes is typically taken to be characterised by perceptual constancy. This 
means that we perceive objects as having the same shape when we look at the objects from 
different perspectives. In some sense, the object is in these cases taken to “look” differently from 
different perspectives.  
    Now, it is quite clear that a perceptual experience of a shape may vary in the sense that one’s 
experience is changing when an object is rotating in front of one. Let us, for example, assume 
that we are perceiving a rotating coin. In this case, there is something that is constant in 
perception, which accounts for the perceptual constancy, but there is also something that is 
changing. Is the phenomenal vehicle for our representation of the shape of the coin successively 
changing when the coin is rotating? Or is the fact that the “looks” of the shape are changing to 
be explained in some other way?  
    This is a difficult question to answer, and I cannot hope to give a satisfactory answer here – 
that would require a separate paper. I will simply assume that the phenomenal shape is what 
accounts for the constancy in this case, and that it is some other phenomenal property that is 
varying. A very simple argument to this effect is that the shape of the object does not in this case 
appear to be changing; and the easiest – if not the only – way to account for this is by assuming 
that the phenomenal shape is invariant, whereas some perspectival property or other is changing.  
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7 Step 5: Shapes actually or possibly have other shapes as parts 
 
The fifth step claims that shapes can have other shapes as parts, and, by implication, that 
phenomenal shapes can have other phenomenal shapes as parts. Many properties have other 
determinate properties of the same determinable as parts. Johansson (2004, 41ff) points out that 
this is true not only of shapes but also of mass and volume. Thus, for example, the volume 2 m3 
may have two volumes of 1 m3 each as parts; and the mass 2 kg might similarly have two parts, 
each consisting of 1 kg. 
    It is also often assumed – not least in geometry – that shapes can also have other shapes as 
parts. Mandelbrot, for example, famously defined a fractal as “a shape made of parts similar to 
the whole in some way”. (Feder 1988, 11) 
   But we need not only consider such relatively sophisticated shapes as fractals in order to see 
that shapes can have parts. Consider a two-dimensional figure such as a quadrangle. If two 
straight lines are drawn on the quadrangle, so that a cross is formed inside the quadrangle, the 
quadrangle has four other shapes as parts. Depending on how the cross is drawn, we can say that 
the quadrangle has four quadrangles as parts, four rectangles as parts or four triangles as parts. 
    It is important to note that shape tokens need not actually have other shapes as parts. Even 
when they don’t, however, they are type-identical to other tokens which have other shapes as 
parts. Thus, for example, a token of the quadrangle mentioned above may not have any actual 
parts. But it may be type-identical to a quadrangle that has other parts. One quadrangle may, as 
we have seen, have four other quadrangles as parts, and a third quadrangle may have four 
triangles as parts.  
    At this point, it might be objected that a quadrangle that is composed of four triangles is 
necessarily different from a shape that is composed of four quadrangles. It could not be type-
identical to a quadrangle that was not composed of our triangles. In reply, I would like to make 
two observations.  
    First of all, if this were the case, then we would also have to say that a line of 9 metres, 
consisting of two lines that were 6 metres and 3 metres, would not be type-identical to a line of 9 
metres that consisted of two lines of 5 metres and 4 metres. We would in other words have to 
reject the notion that any property with parts could be type-identical to a property with parts of 
different types. In my opinion, this is absurd. 
    Secondly, even though our two quadrangles are numerically different tokens, they might still be 
tokens of the same type. There is nothing that prevents a property-type from having tokens with 
mutually inconsistent sets of possible parts. Thus, even though it might well be the case that a 
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token of a shape with four triangles as parts could never in any sense be token-identical to a 
shape with four quadrangles as parts, it is perfectly possible that it is type-identical to a shape 
with four quadrangles as parts. This is no stranger than the fact that the number 9 is identical to 
both the sum of four and five and to the sum of three and six.  
 
 
8 Step 6: The mereological principles that apply to shapes do not apply to any other 
entities 
 
The sixth step claims that the mereological principles governing how shapes qua parts form 
shapes qua wholes are unique to shapes. These principles do not pertain to any other kinds of 
entities. The kind of parthood relation that obtains between shapes can only obtain between 
shapes. Or, more specifically, the kind of parthood relation that obtains between n-dimensional 
shapes can only obtain between n-dimensional shapes.  
   There are two crucial principles which separate the parthood relations obtaining between 
shapes from other parthood relations. While it is possible to find other entities where one 
principle governs the formation of wholes out of parts, it is not possible to find other entities 
where both principles govern the formation of wholes out of parts. 
    The first principle is that the kind of whole formed by different shapes depends on the relative 
location of the shapes in a spatial structure. The second principle is that shapes do not conform 
to the formal-mereological axiom or theorem that a whole cannot have itself as a proper part. Or, 
to be more precise, a shape-type can have itself as a proper part. But a shape-token cannot have 
itself as a proper part. Thus, for example, a particular sphere can have another particular sphere 
of the same type as a proper part. But a particular sphere cannot have itself as a proper part. 
   It is quite obvious that the shape-whole formed by two shape-parts depends upon the relative 
location of the parts in space. Let us say that shapes located so that they form a shape are placed 
in a certain configuration. Which shape they form then depends upon the configuration of the 
shapes. Eight cubes may for example form a cube when they are placed in one configuration but 
a rectangular cuboid of some shape when they are placed in a different configuration. The 
dimensionality of the shape is in this respect crucial. N-dimensional shapes must be placed in 
spaces with at least n-dimensions.  
    Three-dimensional shapes are located in spaces with at least three-dimensions. They can in 
principle be located in spaces with more than three-dimensions, but for the sake of simplicity, we 
will focus on the three-dimensional example. Thus, the relative location of the parts of a shape 
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can vary in at least three dimensions. If one of the parts that compose a shape is “moved” in one 
dimension, then a new whole is formed.  
    It is true that this first principle also applies to ordinary material objects. This is because 
ordinary material objects exemplify shapes. This principle, however, does not apply to objects 
which cannot be described in geometrical terms. For these objects cannot be said to form 
different wholes depending on their location in space. 
    The second important characteristic is that shapes can have themselves as proper parts. We 
have seen that this is what characterises fractals. It can also characterise less sophisticated shapes 
such as quadrangles or cubes. A cube may, for example, have eight other cubes as parts. Stephen 
Kearns (2011, 91) has put this point nicely in a recent paper:  
 
Some (abstract) shapes are self-similar and some are not. That is, some shapes (such as 
fractals) are (qualitatively) identical to parts of themselves while other shapes are not 
qualitatively identical to any part of themselves. Furthermore, if two abstract shapes are 
qualitatively identical to each other, then they are in fact numerically identical (and vice 
versa). Therefore, some shapes have themselves as parts and other shapes do not have 
themselves as parts.  
 
We need not follow Kearns in claiming that qualitative identity entails numerical identity for 
shapes. 
   Shapes are different from other spatial objects, such as material objects. Material objects cannot 
have themselves as proper parts. It makes no sense to assume, for example, that a wall of bricks 
can be composed of itself plus some other bricks. The reason for this is that material objects 
exemplify other properties than shapes, for example mass and size. Mass-properties and size-
properties cannot have themselves as proper parts. The weight 7 kg cannot have itself as a proper 
part. Consequently, a wall that weighs, for example, 50 tons, cannot have itself as a proper part, 
for this would entail that the wall would be heavier than 50 tons, which automatically generates a 
contradiction. 
    At this point it might be objected that shapes are just abstract entities. So what I have said so 
far has no applicability to phenomenal shapes or the objects of perception. Here, I would 
emphatically disagree. Properties such as shapes are exemplified in the world by both perceptual 
experiences and objects in the surrounding environment. In fact, a very good case could be made 
that properties only exist as exemplified in the spatiotemporal world. There is no platonic realm 
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that is separate from the spatiotemporal world and populated by abstract properties. Shapes such 
as cubes and quadrangles exist in the objects that exemplify them. 
    If the present analysis is correct, there are two crucial characteristics of the mereology of 
shapes. The kind of whole formed by the parts depends on the parts’ relative location in space. 
This means that shapes are dissimilar from all other entities than geometrical entities such as 
material objects. The second characteristic is that shapes can have themselves as proper parts. 
This differentiates shapes from all other geometrical entities such as ordinary material objects and 
volumes. The mereology of shapes is, in other words, governed by a unique set of principles that 
applies to no other entities than shapes. 
 
 
9 Step 7: The parthood relations that obtain between phenomenal shapes reliably track 
parthood relations between the properties phenomenal shapes reliably track 
 
In the sixth step, we learned that shapes can have parts. Since phenomenal shapes are shapes too, 
they can also have parts. In the present section, I will argue that if a phenomenal shape reliably 
tracks a type of property (for example shapes), then the parthood relations that obtain between 
the parts of this phenomenal shape will reliably track parthood relations between the entities 
phenomenal shapes reliably track.  
    The parthood relations that obtain between phenomenal shapes reliably track the parthood 
relations between whatever entities they reliably track. The closing part of the argument that 
phenomenal shapes cannot reliably track other properties than shapes is very simple. Let us bear 
in mind that phenomenal shapes are shapes and that consequently the principles for the 
mereology of shapes apply to phenomenal shapes as well. A consequence of this is that the 
parthood relations that obtain between phenomenal shapes reliably track the parthood relations 
between whatever entities phenomenal shapes reliably track.  
    We can express this in general terms by assuming that p is a phenomenal shape that is 
composed of two phenomenal shapes q and r. Let us also assume that p is a token of the type P, q 
is a token of the type Q and r is a token of the type R, and that the phenomenal shape type Pp 
reliably tracks the shape P’, Qp reliably tracks the shape Q’ and R reliably tracks the shape R’. If 
this is the case, P:s that are composed of Q:s and R:s will reliably track P’:s that are composed of 
Q’:s and R’:s. Let us illustrate this by giving an example from our world. If a phenomenal cube 
has a phenomenal sphere as a part, and if phenomenal cubes reliably track cubes and phenomenal 
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spheres reliably track spheres, then phenomenal cubes with phenomenal spheres as parts will 
reliably track cubes with spheres as parts.  
    In order to see why we should accept this principle, we could ponder a scenario where it is not 
true. Let us assume that in this scenario, phenomenal cubes with phenomenal spheres as parts do 
not reliably track cubes with spheres as parts but merely cubes. If this were the case, phenomenal 
cubes with phenomenal spheres as parts would not reliably track spheres at all. Consequently, 
phenomenal spheres would not reliably track spheres. But this contradicts the assumption above 
that phenomenal spheres would reliably track spheres.  
    It should be noted, in order to prevent misunderstanding, that I am not claiming that a type of 
phenomenal shape, such as P in the example above, reliably tracks what its parts are tracking. My 
claim is that those P:s that are composed by Q:s and R:s must also reliably track P:s that are 
composed of Q:s and R:s. For if this were not the case, we would be forced to conclude that Qp:s 
or Rp:s did not reliably track anything. 
    The point is a general one. The parthood relations obtaining between phenomenal shapes will 
reliably track parthood relations among the entities phenomenal shapes reliably track. For a 
phenomenal shape cannot, according to the argument above, be composed of other phenomenal 
shapes without reliably tracking a whole that is composed of the entities that their parts reliably 
track. But that, alas, was what this section attempted to demonstrate. 
 
 
10 Step 8: If phenomenal shapes reliably track anything, they reliably track shapes 
 
We are now in a position to see that phenomenal shapes cannot reliably track any entities other 
than shapes. According to the sixth step, the mereological principles governing shapes are unique 
to shapes. So it is only n-dimensional shapes that can bear the type of relation that holds between 
the parts and wholes of n-dimensional shapes. According to the seventh step, the parthood 
relations that obtain between phenomenal shapes reliably track parthood relations between the 
entities phenomenal shapes reliably track. So, by implication, phenomenal shapes cannot reliably 
track anything but shapes. 
    I conclude that if phenomenal shapes reliably track anything, they will reliably track shapes. 
Insofar as computational properties are shapes, phenomenal shapes can reliably track them. But 
insofar as computational properties are not shapes, they cannot be tracked by phenomenal 
shapes. Note that phenomenal shapes cannot reliably track entities which merely exemplify shapes. 
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They can only track entities which are shapes. An ordinary material object cannot have itself as a 
proper part, even though it exemplifies shapes. But shapes can have themselves as proper parts. 
 
 
11 An objection and a reply 
 
An anonymous referee has suggested that we can successfully model space in a computer, even 
though the computer is not literally using space itself in the medium of representation. The 
objection goes on to suggest that in this case there will be an isomorphism between the coded 
representations in the computer and the space that is represented; and if a brain in a vat was 
hooked up to such a computer, phenomenal space would be isomorphic to these computational 
properties and so would represent them.  
    The argument has three steps. The first step is a claim to the effect that a computer can model 
space without using space itself (i.e. there need not be spheres in a space in the computer in order 
for it to represent spheres in physical space). I think the first step is a reasonable assumption and 
will without further ado accept it. 
    The second step claims that there will be an isomorphism between the computational 
properties and the space that is represented. That is an assumption that I will reject. The third 
step claims that the first two steps entail that a brain in a vat that was hooked up to such a 
computer and which was our “phenomenal twin” (or had relevantly similar experiences as we 
have) would represent these computational structures. Given that the first two steps are correct, 
this would indeed entail the third step. But I think that the argument can be stopped at the 
second step. 
   Let us begin by noting that the objection presupposes, or at least the referee seems to 
presuppose, that I have actually shown that the spatial character of our visual experience can only 
represent something that is isomorphic to it.  
    Now, if my argument in this paper is correct, a geometrical structure of some kind can only be 
isomorphic to another geometrical structure of some kind. For shapes are unique among 
properties in the sense that a shape can be type-identical to one or more of its parts. No other 
property can have parts with which it is type-identical. Since shapes are only to be found in space, 
it follows that phenomenal space can only be isomorphic to other spaces and, more broadly, that 
spaces in general can only be isomorphic to other spaces.  
    The argument by the referee proceeds by claiming that if a computer models a space, then the 
computer will be isomorphic to a space. I would deny that this is the case. Even though a 
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computer can model a space, there need be no computational state that has a spatial or geometric 
character.  
    Consider, for example, a very simple spatial model. Let us assume that a computer models a 
space by assigning coordinates to positions in the space. Each position in space could in that way 
be represented as either occupied by some entity or as unoccupied. It is in that way possible to 
represent various shapes in a purely digital way, where the representation is not in any way 
isomorphic to what is represented. The medium of representation would in such a case only 
consist of a set of coordinates, each of which consists of a triplet of numbers and a 
representation of the coordinate as being either occupied or empty. The medium of 
representation is in this case not isomorphic to what is represented. It makes no sense to say that 
the representation of a shape in such a system could have something type-identical as a part. 
    So I conclude that the fact that computers could successfully represent space does not entail 
that the medium of representation must be isomorphic to what is represented. A fortiori, it does 
not follow from the fact that we could have phenomenal twins who are brains in vats that our 
twins would necessarily represent a spatial structure of some kind.  
 
 
12 Concluding words 
 
I have argued that the vehicle for representing shapes – phenomenal shapes – can only represent 
shapes. I have, however, noted that there is nothing that precludes that phenomenal shapes 
represent shapes in non-physical spaces. Which kinds of spaces are there? I have suggested that 
the phenomenal character of visual experience forms one kind of space, and we obviously know 
that physical space is another kind of space. It is distinctly possible that there are yet other kinds 
of spaces. 
    This invites the following kind of objection. Even if I have shown that phenomenal shapes 
must represent shapes, would it not be possible for brains in vats to represent shapes in other 
spaces than physical spaces, for example a computational space? 
    In reply, I would like to make two observations. The first observation is that we really don’t 
know to what extent there could be other spaces than phenomenal and physical ones. In the case 
of computers, it seems unlikely that they actually instantiate spaces. Computers work by digital 
representations and not by analogue representations.  
    Secondly, and more importantly, even if computers (or other kinds of entities that brains in 
vats might be hooked up to) could instantiate a space of some kind such that the visual 
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experiences of brains in vats reliably tracked occurrences in that space, we would indeed have to 
say that these brains in vats represented that space and that phenomenal shapes represented 
shapes in that space. But – and this is the important point – this is rather uninteresting from the 
point of view of Twin-Earth scenarios such as those involving brains in vats. 
    Let us recall that brain-in-vat scenarios were designed precisely in order to show that our 
vehicles of representation could represent something different than they do on earth. If my 
argument in this paper is correct, this is not true with respect to shapes. Even though we may 
suppose that brains in vats might be able to represent shapes in these non-physical spaces, they 
would still represent the same shapes we represent on earth.  
     Spaces of different ontological kinds are capable of exemplifying shapes with the same 
universal. Consequently, there is nothing that prevents phenomenal, physical and computational 
(if such can exist) spaces from exemplifying the same geometrical properties like sphericity. Being 
spherical is the same property in a physical and a phenomenal space. However, it is a property of 
physical entities in the first space and of phenomenal entities in the second space. If there can be 
computational spaces, it would be the same property of sphericality that was exemplified in such 
spaces as in physical space. It would, however, be computational entities which were spherical in 
the computational space and physical entities which were spherical in the physical space. 
Nevertheless, the physical object and the computational object would exemplify the same shape-
universal. 
    I conclude that the brain-in-vat scenario shows that the brain in vat either has an impoverished 
content in comparison to us (and hence fails as a Twin-Earth scenario) or that it represents 
shapes and other geometrical entities just as we do. 
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